Learning requirements for stealth attacks by Sun, Ke et al.
LEARNING REQUIREMENTS FOR STEALTH ATTACKS
Ke Sun∗, In˜aki Esnaola∗†, Antonia M. Tulino§‡, H. Vincent Poor†
∗ Dept. of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 3JD, UK
§ Nokia Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ 07733, USA
†Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
‡University degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, 80138 Naples, Italy
ABSTRACT
The learning data requirements are analyzed for the construc-
tion of stealth attacks in state estimation. In particular, the
training data set is used to compute a sample covariance ma-
trix that results in a random matrix with a Wishart distribu-
tion. The ergodic attack performance is defined as the av-
erage attack performance obtained by taking the expectation
with respect to the distribution of the training data set. The
impact of the training data size on the ergodic attack perfor-
mance is characterized by proposing an upper bound for the
performance. Simulations on the IEEE 30-Bus test system
show that the proposed bound is tight in practical settings.
Index Terms— stealth attacks, data injection attacks, ran-
dom matrix theory, information theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Data injection attacks [1] are one of the main threats that the
smart grid faces. Attack constructions that exploit the sparsity
of the data injection vector have been proposed [2] as practical
constructions that can disrupt the state estimation performed
by the operator. Distributed attack construction and detection
strategies are studied in [3, 4, 5, 6] where it is shown that the
bad data detection procedures put in place by the operator can
be defeated by several attackers that control a subset of the
sensing infrastructure in the grid. Modelling the state vari-
ables as a random process, attack constructions that exploit
the statistical knowledge of the state variables are proposed in
[7, 8]. The addition of probabilistic structure to the state vari-
ables opens the door to the definition of information theoretic
attacks for which the damage and probability of detection are
characterized in terms of information measures [9]. In [10]
the assumption of perfect knowledge of the statistics of the
state variables is relaxed by considering a training data set to
learn the statistics. Therein, it is numerically shown that the
performance of the attack when imperfect knowledge of the
statistics is available changes significantly with respect to the
case with perfect knowledge. In this paper, we analytically
characterize the impact of the training data size and the cor-
relation between state variables over the attack performance.
2. SYSTEMMODEL
2.1. State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
The measurement model for state estimation with linearized
dynamics is given by
YM = HXN + ZM , (1)
where YM ∈ RM is a vector of random variables describ-
ing the measurements; XN ∈ RN is a vector of random
variables describing the state variables; H ∈ RM×N is the
linearized Jacobian measurement matrix which is determined
by the power network topology and the admittances of the
branches; and ZM ∈ RM is the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with distribution N (0, σ2IM ) where σ2 is
the variance of the error introduced by the sensors [11], [12,
Chapter 15]. The vector of the state variables is assumed to
follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by XN ∼
N (0,ΣXX), where ΣXX is the positive-definite covariance
matrix of the distribution of the state variables. The Gaussian
assumption for the vector of the state variables is also adopted
by [7] and [8]. As a result of the linear measurement model
in (1), the vector of measurements also follows a multivariate
Gaussian distribution denoted by YM ∼ N (0,ΣYY ), where
ΣYY = HΣXXH
T + σ2IM .
Data injection attacks corrupt the measurements available
to the operator by adding an attack vector to the measure-
ments. The resulting vector of compromised measurements is
given by
YMA = HX
N + ZM +AM , (2)
where AM ∈ RM is the attack vector and YMA ∈ RM
is the vector containing the compromised measurements
[1]. Following the approach in [9] we adopt a Gaussian
framework for the construction of the attack vector, i.e.
AM ∼ N (0,ΣAA), where ΣAA is the covariance matrix
of the attack distribution. The rationale for choosing a Gaus-
sian distribution for the attack vector follows from the fact
that for the attack model in (2) the additive attack distri-
bution that minimizes the mutual information between the
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vector of state variables and the compromised measure-
ments is Gaussian [13]. Because of the Gaussianity of
the attack distribution, the vector of compromised mea-
surements is distributed as YMA ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA), where
ΣYAYA = HΣXXH
T + σ2IM + ΣAA.
The operator of the power system makes use of the ac-
quired measurements to detect the attack. The detection prob-
lem is cast as a hypothesis testing problem with hypotheses
H0 : YM ∼ N (0,ΣYY ), versus (3)
H1 : YM ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA). (4)
The null hypothesisH0 describes the case in which the power
system is not compromised, while the alternative hypothesis
H1 describes the case in which the power system is under at-
tack. The Neyman-Pearson lemma [14] states that for a fixed
probability of Type I error, the likelihood ratio test (LRT)
achieves the minimum Type II error when compared with any
other test with an equal or smaller Type I error. Consequently,
the LRT is chosen to decide betweenH0 andH1 based on the
available measurements. The LRT between H0 and H1 takes
following form:
L(y)
∆
=
fYMA (y)
fYM (y)
H1
≷
H0
τ, (5)
where y ∈ RM is a realization of the vector of random vari-
ables modelling the measurements, fYMA and fYM denote the
probability density functions (p.d.f.’s) of YMA and Y
M , re-
spectively, and τ is the decision threshold set by the operator
to meet the false alarm constraint.
2.2. Information-Theoretic Attacks
The purpose of the attacker is to disrupt the normal state esti-
mation procedure by minimizing the information that the op-
erator acquires about the state variables, while guaranteeing
that the probability of attack detection is small enough, and
therefore, remain concealed in the system. To that end, the at-
tacker aims to minimize the mutual information between the
vector of state variables and the vector of compromised mea-
surements denoted by I(XN ;YMA ). On the other hand, we
assess the performance of attack detection by the LRT via the
Chernoff-Stein lemma [15], which characterizes the asymp-
totic exponent of the probability of detection when the num-
ber of observations of measurement vectors grows to infinity.
In our setting, the Chernoff-Stein lemma states that for any
LRT and  ∈ (0, 1/2), it holds that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log βn = −D(PYMA ‖PYM ), (6)
where D(·‖·) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, βn is
the minimum Type II error such that the Type I error α satis-
fies α < , and n is the number of M -dimensional measure-
ment vectors that are available for the LRT. Therefore, for
the attacker, minimizing the asymptotic detection probability
is equivalent to minimizing D(PYMA ‖PYM ), where PYMA and
PYM denote the probability distributions of YMA and Y
M , re-
spectively.
A stealthy attack construction that combines these two in-
formation measures in one cost function is proposed in [10].
Interestingly, the resulting cost function boils down to the ef-
fective secrecy proposed in [16] which can be written as
I(XN ;YMA )+D(PYMA ‖PYM )=D(PXNYMA ‖PXNPYM ),(7)
where PXNYMA is the joint distribution of X
N and YMA . The
resulting attack construction problem is equivalent to solving
the following optimization problem:
min
AM
D(PXNYMA ‖PXNPYM ). (8)
Under the attack Gaussianity assumption the cost function in
(7) is a function of the attack covariance matrix ΣAA. Let us
define the cost function for the Gaussian case as
f(ΣAA)
∆
=
1
2
[
tr(Σ−1YY ΣAA)−log|ΣAA+σ2IM |−log|Σ−1YY |
]
. (9)
It is shown in [9] that (8) is a convex optimization problem
and that the covariance matrix for the optimal Gaussian attack
is Σ?AA
∆
= HΣXXH
T.
3. LEARNING ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
The stealth attack construction proposed above requires per-
fect knowledge of the covariance matrix of the state variables
and the linearized Jacobian measurement matrix. In the fol-
lowing we study the performance of the attack when the sec-
ond order statistics are not perfectly known by the attacker
but the linearized Jacobian measurement matrix is known. We
model the partial knowledge by assuming that the attacker has
access to a sample covariance matrix of the state variables.
Specifically, the training data consisting of K state variable
realizations {XNi }Ki=1 is available to the attacker. That being
the case the attacker computes the unbiased estimate of the
covariance matrix of the state variables given by
SXX =
1
K − 1
K∑
i=1
XNi (X
N
i )
T. (10)
The stealth attack constructed using the sample covariance
matrix follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by
A˜M ∼ N (0,ΣA˜A˜), (11)
where ΣA˜A˜ = HSXXH
T.
Since the sample covariance matrix in (10) is a random
matrix with central Wishart distribution given by
SXX ∼ 1
K − 1WN (K − 1,ΣXX), (12)
the ergodic counterpart of the cost function in (7) is defined
in terms of the conditional KL divergence given by
ESXX
[
D
(
PXNYMA |SXX‖PXNPYM
)]
. (13)
The ergodic cost function characterizes the expected perfor-
mance of the attack averaged over the realizations of training
data. Note that the performance using the sample covariance
matrix is suboptimal [10] and that the ergodic performance
converges asymptotically to the optimal attack construction
when the size of the training data set increases.
4. UPPER BOUND FOR ERGODIC ATTACK
PERFORMANCE
In this section, we analytically characterize the ergodic attack
performance defined in (13) by providing an upper bound us-
ing random matrix theory tools. Before introducing the upper
bound, some auxiliary results on the expected value of the ex-
treme eigenvalues of Wishart random matrices are presented
below.
4.1. Auxiliary Results in Random Matrix Theory
Lemma 1. Let ZL be an (K − 1) × L matrix whose entries
are independent standard normal random variables, then
var (smax(ZL)) ≤ 1, (14)
where var (·) denotes the variance and smax(ZL) is the max-
imum singular value of ZL.
Proof. Note that smax(ZL) is a 1-Lipschitz function of
matrix ZL, the maximum singular value of ZL is con-
centrated around the mean [17, Proposition 5.34] given by
E[smax(ZL)]. Then for t ≥ 0, it holds that
P[|smax(ZL)−E[smax(ZL)]| > t] ≤ 2 exp{−t2/2} (15)
≤ exp{1− t2/2}. (16)
Therefore smax(ZL) is a sub-gaussian random variable with
variance proxy σ2p ≤ 1. The lemma follows from the fact that
var (smax(ZL)) ≤ σ2p.
Lemma 2. Let WL denote a central Wishart matrix dis-
tributed as 1K−1WL(K − 1, IL), then the non-asymptotic
expected value of the extreme eigenvalues of WL is bounded
by (
1−
√
L/(K − 1)
)2
≤ E[λmin(WL)] (17)
and
E[λmax(WL)] ≤
(
1 +
√
L/(K − 1)
)2
+ 1/(K − 1), (18)
where λmin(WL) and λmax(WL) denote the minimum
eigenvalue and maximum eigenvalue of WL, respectively.
Proof. Note that [17, Theorem 5.32]
√
K − 1−
√
L ≤ E[smin(ZL)] (19)
and √
K − 1 +
√
L ≥ E[smax(ZL)], (20)
where smin(ZL) is the minimum singular value of ZL. Given
the fact that WL = 1K−1Z
T
LZL, then it holds that
E[λmin(WL)] =
E
[
smin(ZL)
2
]
K − 1 ≥
E [smin(ZL)]2
K − 1 (21)
and
E[λmax(WL)]=
E
[
smax(ZL)
2
]
K−1 ≤
E[smax(ZL)]2+1
K−1 , (22)
where (22) follows from Lemma 1. Combining (19) with
(21), and (20) with (22), respectively, yields the lemma.
4.2. Main Result
The ergodic attack performance is given by
E [f(ΣA˜A˜)]
=
1
2
E
[
tr(Σ−1YY ΣA˜A˜)−log |ΣA˜A˜+σ2IM |−log |Σ−1YY |
]
=
1
2
(
tr
(
Σ−1YY Σ
?
AA
)−log∣∣Σ−1YY∣∣−E[log|ΣA˜A˜+σ2IM |]). (23)
The assessment of the ergodic attack performance boils down
to evaluating the last term in (23). Closed form expressions
for this term are provided in [18] for the same case considered
in this paper. However, the resulting expressions are involved
and are only computable for small dimensional settings. For
systems with a large number of dimensions the expressions
are computationally prohibitive. To circumvent this challenge
we propose a lower bound on the term that yields an upper
bound on the ergodic attack performance. Before presenting
the main result we provide the following auxiliary convex op-
timization result.
Lemma 3. Let Wp denote a central Wishart matrix dis-
tributed as 1K−1Wp(K − 1, Ip) and let B = diag(b1, . . . , bp)
denote a positive definite diagonal matrix. Then
E
[
log
∣∣B + W−1p ∣∣] ≥ p∑
i=1
log (bi + 1/x
?
i ) , (24)
where x?i is the solution to the convex optimization problem
given by
min
{xi}pi=1
p∑
i=1
log (bi + 1/xi) (25)
s.t.
p∑
i=1
xi = p (26)
max (xi) ≤
(
1 +
√
p/(K − 1)
)2
+ 1/(K − 1) (27)
min (xi) ≥
(
1−
√
p/(K − 1)
)2
. (28)
Proof. Note that
E
[
log
∣∣B + W−1p ∣∣] = p∑
i=1
E
[
log
(
bi +
1
λi(Wp)
)]
(29)
≥
p∑
i=1
log
(
bi +
1
E[λi(Wp)]
)
(30)
where in (29), λi(Wp) is the i-th eigenvalue of Wp in de-
creasing order; (30) follows from Jensen’s inequality due to
the convexity of log
(
bi +
1
x
)
for x > 0. Constraint (26) fol-
lows from the fact that E[trace(Wp)] = p, and constraints
(27) and (28) follow from Lemma 2. This completes the
proof.
The following theorem provides a lower bound for the last
term in (23), and therefore, it enables us to characterize the
ergodic attack performance.
Theorem 1. Let ΣA˜A˜ = HSXXH
T with SXX distributed as
1
K−1WN (K−1,ΣXX) and denote by Λp = diag(λ1, . . . , λp)
the diagonal matrix containing the nonzero eigenvalues in de-
creasing order. Then
E
[
log|ΣA˜A˜+σ2IM |
]
≥
(
p−1∑
i=0
ψ(K − 1− i)
)
− p log(K − 1)
+
p∑
i=1
log
(
λi
σ2
+
1
λ?i
)
+ 2M log σ, (31)
whereψ(·) is the Euler digamma function, p = rank(HΣXXHT),
and {λ?i }pi=1 is the solution to the optimization problem given
by (25) - (28) with bi = λiσ2 , for i = 1, . . . , p.
Proof. We proceed by noticing that
E
[
log|ΣA˜A˜+σ2IM |
]
= E
[
log
∣∣∣∣ 1(K − 1)σ2 ZTMΛZM + IM
∣∣∣∣]+ 2M log σ (32)
= E
[
log
∣∣∣∣∣Λpσ2 ZTpZpK − 1 + IM
∣∣∣∣∣
]
+ 2M log σ (33)
=E
log∣∣∣∣∣ ZTpZpK − 1
∣∣∣∣∣+log
∣∣∣∣∣∣Λpσ2+
(
ZTpZp
K − 1
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣
+2M log σ (34)
≥
(
p−1∑
i=0
ψ(K − 1− i)
)
− p log(K − 1)
+
p∑
i=1
log
(
λi
σ2
+
1
λ?i
)
+ 2M log σ, (35)
where in (32), Λ is a diagonal matrix containing the eigen-
values of HΣXXHT in decreasing order; (33) follows from
the fact that p = rank(HΣXXHT); (35) follows from [19,
Theorem 2.11] and Lemma 3. This completes the proof.
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Fig. 1. Performance of the upper bound in Theorem 2 as a
function of number of sample for ρ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.8 when
SNR = 20 dB.
Theorem 2. The ergodic attack performance given in (23) is
upper bounded by
E [f(ΣA˜A˜)]≤
1
2
(
tr
(
Σ−1YY Σ
?
AA
)−log∣∣Σ−1YY∣∣− 2M log σ
−
( p−1∑
i=0
ψ(K − 1− i)
)
+p log(K − 1)
−
p∑
i=1
log
(
λi
σ2
+
1
λ?i
))
. (36)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from combing Theo-
rem 1 with (23).
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The numerical results are obtained on the IEEE 30-Bus test
system where the Jacobian matrix H is obtained using MAT-
POWER [20]. For the construction of the stealth attack
the covariance matrix of the state variables is chosen to
be a Toeplitz matrix with exponential decay parameter ρ
as in [8]. Specifically, the Toeplitz matrix of dimension
N × N with exponential decay parameter ρ is given by
ΣXX = [sij = ρ
|i−j|; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N ]. We define the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) as
SNR = 10 log10
(
tr(HΣXXHT)
Mσ2
)
. (37)
Fig.1 depicts the upper bound in Theorem 2 as a function of
number of samples for ρ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.8 when SNR =
20 dB. Interestingly, the upper bound in Theorem 2 is tight
for large values of the training data set size for all values of
the exponential decay parameter determining the correlation.
6. REFERENCES
[1] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection
attacks against state estimation in electric power grids,”
in Proc. ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications
Security, Chicago, IL, USA, Nov. 2009, pp. 21–32.
[2] T. T. Kim and H. V. Poor, “Strategic protection against
data injection attacks on power grids,” IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 326–333, Jun. 2011.
[3] S. Cui, Z. Han, S. Kar, T. T. Kim, H. V. Poor, and
A. Tajer, “Coordinated data-injection attack and detec-
tion in the smart grid: A detailed look at enriching de-
tection solutions,” IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 29,
no. 5, pp. 106–115, Sep. 2012.
[4] M. Ozay, I. Esnaola, F. T. Y. Vural, S. R. Kulkarni, and
H. V. Poor, “Sparse attack construction and state es-
timation in the smart grid: Centralized and distributed
models,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 7,
pp. 1306–1318, Jul. 2013.
[5] U. A. Khan and A. M. Stankovic´, “Secure distributed
estimation in cyber-physical systems,” in Proc. IEEE
Int. Conf. on Acoust., Speech and Signal Process., Van-
couver, Canada, May 2013, pp. 5209–5213.
[6] A. Tajer, S. Kar, H. V. Poor, and S. Cui, “Distributed
joint cyber attack detection and state recovery in smart
grids,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Smart Grid Com-
mun., Brussels, Belgium, Oct. 2011, pp. 202–207.
[7] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. J. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Malicious
data attacks on the smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 645–658, Dec. 2011.
[8] I. Esnaola, S. M. Perlaza, H. V. Poor, and O. Kosut,
“Maximum distortion attacks in electricity grids,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 2007–2015, Jul.
2016.
[9] K. Sun, I. Esnaola, S.M. Perlaza, and H.V. Poor,
“Stealth attacks on the smart grid,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1808.04184, 2018.
[10] K. Sun, I. Esnaola, S.M. Perlaza, and H.V. Poor,
“Information-theoretic attacks in the smart grid,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Smart Grid Commum., Dres-
den, Germany, Oct. 2017, pp. 455–460.
[11] A. Abur and A. G. Expo´sito, Power System State Esti-
mation: Theory and Implementation, CRC Press, Mar.
2004.
[12] J. J. Grainger and W. D. Stevenson, Power System Anal-
ysis, McGraw-Hill, 1994.
[13] I. Shomorony and A. S. Avestimehr, “Worst-case addi-
tive noise in wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 3833–3847, Jun. 2013.
[14] H. V. Poor, An Introduction to Signal Detection and
Estimation, Springer, New York, 1994.
[15] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information
Theory, John Wiley & Sons, Nov. 2012.
[16] J. Hou and G. Kramer, “Effective secrecy: Reliability,
confusion and stealth,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on In-
formation Theory, Honolulu, HI, USA, Jun. 2014, pp.
601–605.
[17] R. Vershynin, “Introduction to the non-asymptotic anal-
ysis of random matrices,” in Compressed Sensing: The-
ory and Applications, Y. Eldar and G. Kutyniok, Eds.,
chapter 5, pp. 210–268. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK, 2012.
[18] G. Alfano, A. M. Tulino, A. Lozano, and S. Verdu´, “Ca-
pacity of MIMO channels with one-sided correlation,”
in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. on Spread Spectrum Tech-
niques and Applications, Sydney, Australia, Aug 2004.
[19] A. M. Tulino and S. Verdu´, Random Matrix Theory and
Wireless Communications, Now Publishers Inc, 2004.
[20] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sa´nchez, and R. J.
Thomas, “MATPOWER: Steady-state operations, plan-
ning, and analysis tools for power systems research and
education,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 26, no. 1, pp.
12–19, Feb. 2011.
